(1) Should we treat other people according to what they want (their own values), or according to what we take their best interests to be? Ifthey have given us no mandate to decide for them, their values should prevail. This applies not only to allowing but also to assisting them to get what they want.
(2) Taking this seriously in medical practice involves a lot ofcommunication between doctor and patient, and a lot ofresearch to establish a typology ofpatients in respect oftheir wants. The results would seriously affect doctorpatient relationships and the organisation ofgeneral practice and hospital care. It is with this, rather than dramatic 'moral problems', that medical ethics should be chiefly concerned.
A: I want here to raise, if not to settle, a question of principle which runs through all our dealings with other people, but is perhaps particularly acute for those whose profession highlights certain choices about human interests. The question is, roughly put, 'Ought one to give other people the treatment they want, or opt for, or think best for themselves on the one hand, or the treatment oneself thinks best for them on The interesting thing about this question is that the mere raising of it seems to enforce a particular answer. We ask 'Do we want . . .?', and whatever answer we give will be in accord with our wants -even if our wants take the form ofwanting other people to override our personal views sometimes (even always), as it were giving them a mandate to do so. There is, however, a distinction between allowing another person to have what he wants and assisting him to do so. Some moral philosophers think this distinction to be morally important: thus Foot (2): 'For while it is not normally permissible to seize an object from a man because he will harm himselfwith it, it does not follow that there is an obligation to help him to keep such a thing if it is falling out of his reach'. In general we certainly feel more reluctance in assisting than allowing; and this has particular relevance to professions like that of medicine, where it is more usually a matter of assisting. Ought one actually to provide the patient with the drug he craves, or the means to suicide? Many J S Mill type liberals, thoroughly convinced that to deny people what they want (even if it is not in their best interests) is a kind of tyranny, nevertheless draw the line here.
Again we need some kind of general rule; and again my guess is that we would prefer a rule which put some kind of (perhaps more limited) obligation on other people to help us achieve our own ends, even ifthe ends may be misguided. Certainly we may wish to write some exceptions into the rule: for instance, if we are under some clearly specifiable form of compulsion, such as drug addiction. But in general I think we would side with the parents who give their daughter a proper wedding even if that initiates a disastrous marriage, because that is what we would want if we were in the daughter's shoes. The point is not so much that the marriage cannot be stopped (so that impeding it would be no more than a token gesture of disapproval, a way of keeping the parental hands clean); but rather that genuine love or concern for another person -assuming the person is not a minor, or under some other kind of mandate which gives us the right to decide for himinvolves waiving one's own values in favour of his. As with the parents, we can only hope that discussion based on mutual trust, or an appreciation by the person of how much we value her and would be sorry to see her do harm to herself, will cause her to change her mind.
It Of course this is time-consuming; and it shows the desirability of a system in which the patient has some one person with whom he has a sufficiently close relationship to feel safe about his wants and feelings being known and respected -not just a (any) doctor who can fill in for any other. This has fairly obvious consequences for the way in which health centres, general practice and hospitals are organised, for the mobility of doctors, for the connections between physical and mental health, and many other such matters. Arguably, just as young people badly need some one person (parent, teacher) who will take overall responsibility for their education rather than a shifting population of teachers in oversized schools -someone whose prime expertise is to know them, someone whom they can trust because they are known -so every adult needs a single person to whom he can relate in all matters of health (even if, as of course he must, that person will often send him out to some specialist to solve a particular problem). Without the trust, we cannot get adequate communication: and without the communication, we cannot meet his wants.
My suspicion is that in medical practice, as indeed in most other forms of person-to-person relationships, we have become obsessed with 'moral problems' (which are, in any case, ultimately not our business): problems of life and death, embryos, abortion and so forth. These problems are dramatic, and our earnest and high-minded reflections and discussions on them persuade us that we are 'caring', serious and conscientious. In fact they act as conscience-money, distracting us from the more pedestrian but more important task of trying to find out what other people want in order to play fair with them. Nine times out of ten, in almost any personal relationship, we prefer either to carry on in our own autistic style or else to agonise over 'how to treat' some other person: when what we ought to do is simply to ask him and talk to him (which includes listening).
A good deal of research needs to be done on the techniques of discussion designed to establish what a person's views and values are: most contemporary research is far too large-scale and pre-packaged to do the job properly (3). It requires sensitivity and a thorough grasp of concepts and language: the discussion often turns out to be more like a Socratic dialogue than trying to get someone to answer a questionnaire. Much might be gained if doctors themselves were clearer about the different options that patients might want to take up (as in the examples I gave earlier): that is, essentially, about the different styles and approaches that different people preferred. It is far more complicated than just finding out, for instance, whether a woman prefers 'natural' to other kinds of childbirth: more complicated even than distinguishing those patients that have puritanical views about being ill (they feel guilty about it and dislike 'troubling' the doctor) from those who run for help even when it is not strictly necessary.
C: There is, finally, a problem that I can do no more than mention here. My suggestion has been, in effect, that what we are willing to do for others should be a matter of negotiation in terms of our respective wants: a kind of contract-making between one person and another (doctor and patient), rather than the imposition of values by either party. But unfortunately there is no reason to believe that all parties would agree to the same kind of contract. Thus the laws of the land represent, or ought to represent, some sort of mutual deal which incorporates the values of all citizens; and whilst to some extent this is true -most people do not want to be assaulted, or stolen from, or defrauded -it cannot do justice to variations in individual wants, because for purposes of practical administration it has to be the same for all. Similarly, though doctor-patient deals may be generalisable over a wide area, there is no reason to suppose that any single deal would be acceptable to all doctors and all patients (for instance, in respect of euthanasia or drugs).
I suspect that quite a lot of the (usually unmerited) distrust of orthodox medical practice -as evidenced by 'alternative medicine', for instance -arises from this cause. It is not so much that people think orthodox medicine to be in some absolute sense 'wrong', but rather that they think their own wants and values to be disregarded because of what one might call professional or administrative pressure -that is, the (understandable) desire to maintain some single set of standards which will apply to all medical practice. Certainly abuses have to be guarded against: but here again, in the light of what I have said, what is to count as 'abuse' must be negotiated rather than presumed. The position with psychotherapy is much looser: patients often make very different deals (overt or tacit) with different brands of therapists, and there seems nothing wrong with that. Perhaps this is something that could be extended into the area of physical health. But in order to get clear about the possible types of contract which could reasonably be offered, both doctors and patients would have to be clearer than I, at least, would claim to be about what their wants and values actually are. There is an interesting comparison here with marriage: many people nowadays do not go along with many versions of public and official marriage contracts, and attempt to negotiate something with their partner which better represents the wants of the two parties. Here the wants, fears and other emotions ofhuman beings are even more obscure than they are in regard to health; but that, fortunately, is outside the scope of this paper. 
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For the past two years he was chairman of a working party, appointed by the Institute and funded by the Nuffield Foundation, on methods of teaching medical ethics to medical students. Although he was unable to attend the final meeting, he had approved previously the working party's recommendations, which will be published later this year as the Pond Report on Teaching Medical Ethics.
